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CONTROLLED PUBLIC WORKS AS A STABILIZING
FACTOR: SOME BASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY
FLEXIBLE PUBLIC WORKS AS A STABILIZING DEVICE
DETAILED examination of the wider implications of the theo-
retical questions raised by the suggested utilization of public
works as an agency of economic stabilization in an unstable
economic system does not fall within the scope of this study.'
The proposal is, on the one hand, closely interrelated with
basic problems of business cycle theory, and on the other, is
merely part of the large complex of problems involved in the
construction of public improvements by governmental agen-
cies. These theoretical aspects have been discussed by econ-
omists for some years both in this country and abroad.2 In this
1Theproblem is treated at length in the companion report on The Economics
of Planned Public Works recently made by Professor J. M. Clark to the
National Planning Board.
the discussion of the problem in English, see the following American
and British studies: 0. T. Mallery, The Long-Range Planning of Public Works,
in Business Cycles and Unemployment (NewYork,1923); F. G. Dickinson,
Public Construction and Cyclical Unemployment, Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Supplement, September 1928;Public
Works and Unemployment, American Economic Review, Supplement, March
Leo Wolman, Planning and Control of Public Works (National Bureau
of Economic Research, C. Bielschowsky, Business Fluctuations and
Public Works, Quarterly Journal of Economics, February ig3o; E. C. Har-
wood, A Criticism of Stimulated Construction, The Annalist, May '93°;
V. A. Mund, Prosperity Reserves of Public Works, Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Supplement, May Hearings
before U. S. Senate sub-committees on Sen. Res. 219 (1Q28 and 1929), S. 2475
(1928), S. 3059, S. 3060, S. ('930) and S. 2419 (t932); Stabilizing Employ-
ment Through Public Works Programs, American Labor Legislation Review,
June 1932; W. N. Loucks, The Stabilization of Employment in Philadelphia,
(Philadelphia, C. Gill, The Effectiveness of Public Works in Stabiliz-
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chapter an attempt will be made merely to raise these basic
issues and to express such tentative opinions concerning them
seem justifledinthe lightofthefactual and analytic survey
presented in the body of this study.
SOME CRUCIAL FACTORS IN INDUSTRIAL FLUCTUATIONS
As a background for the better evaluation of the proposal
for utilization of controlled public works as a stabilizing in-
fluence, brief mention may perhaps be made to advantage of
some of the crucial factors, well recognized though they are,
in the process of cyclical business fluctuation.3
ing the Construction Industry and R. F. Kahn, Public Works and Inflation,
American Statistical Association Journal, Supplement, March 1933; A. D.
Gayer, Public Works, in Encylopaedia of the Social Sciences(1934), and
Monetary Policy and Public Works, Special Report No. V in Econo,nic Recon-
struction (Columbia University Press,
D.H. MacGregor, British Aspects of Unemployment in Some Aspects of
Recent British Economics (Chicago, 1923);A.L. Bowley and F. D. Stuart,
Regularization of the Demand for Labour, and A. C. Pigou, Correctives of the
Trade Cycle, in Is Unemployment Inevitable? (London, 1924);R.G. Hawtrey,
Public Expenditures and the Demand for Labour, Economica,, March 1925;
Britain's Industrial Future (Liberal Industrial Inquiry, London, 1928); J. M.
Keynes, Letters to The Times (London), August 7, 1929; H. Clay, The Post-
War Unemployment Problem (London, 1929); A. C. Pigou, The Monetary
Theory of the Trade Cycle, in The Economic Journal, Vol. XXXIX, London,
1929; P. W. Martin, The Problem of Maintaining Purchasing Power (London,
1931); R. F. Kahn, The Relation of Home Investment to Unemployment, in
The Economic Journal, Vol. XLI, London, June 1931; J. M. Keynes, The
Means to Prosperity (London, 1933) and R. C. Davison, The Unemployed
(London, 1929).
For Continental European sources see the following: Statistisches Amt, Die
Staatsausgaben von Grossbritannien, Frankreich, Belgien und Italien, Einzel-
schriften zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, No. 2(Berlin, 1927); Nicola
Muratore, La Finanza delle Opere Pubbliche (Milan, 1928); Unemployment and
Public Works, International Labour Office (Geneva, 1931); B. Ohlin, Now or
Never: Action to Combat the World Depression in Index, Stockholm, Vol.
VII, No. 77, May 1932; T. G. Spates, International Planning of Public Works,
Geneva Special Studies, Vol. 3, No.(March 1932); Erik Lindahl, Offentlig-
aarbeteniDepressionstider in Nationalekonomiska Foreningen, Forhänd-
lingar, 1932(Stockholm, 1933), with discussion by G. Bagge, E. Hecksher,
B. Ohlin, J. Akerman and others; Gunnar Myrdal, Finanspolitikens Ekono-
iniska Verkningar (Stockholm, '934).
In this section I have drawn on recent discussions with Dr. M. A. Heilperin
IPLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
A breakdown of economic activity occurs when private indus-
try ceases to make new capital investments, or makes them at a
greatly decelerated rate. Since more has been produced than the
market can absorb at a given price schedule, the recession is
characterized by a falling off of production in capital and other
durable goods industries, by attendant unemployment, by a de-
crease in total consumers' incomes, by consequent contracted
demand for consumption goods, by more unemployment, by less
production, and so on.
The process does not, however, continue indefinitely. Though
the forces that tend to come into operation and arrest it sooner or
later are still shrouded in considerable obscurity, the following
factors clearly play an important part: obsolescence of existing
plant due to wear and tear, and to lack of use; obsolescence caused
by new inventions; readjustment of the cost-debt-price structure
through bankruptcies, forced sales of plant, voluntary reorgani-
zations, etc. Fixed costs of production are reduced by considerable
writing-off of old plant, particularly in respect of interest-bearing
capital investment in buildings and real estate. These readjust-
ments make possible a larger net profit per unit from a given
amount of gross earnings. Thus in time, after the readjustment
has been effected, new investment again becomes profitable, and
recovery begins.
Other forces, however, also come into operation during a period
of decline which may entirely or in part offset these factors which
make for a decrease in productiOn costs. When sales and output
fall the burden of overhead costs per unit of output increases. A
large volume of unemployment itself retards recovery while also,
from the social viewpoint, entailing a loss of real national income.
During depressions a relatively greater decline occurs in the de-
mand for, and hence the price of producers' than of consumers'
goods: the contraction of the market for the latter, however,
makes it unprofitable for the producers of these goods to extend
of the University of Geneva and the Rockefeller Foundation, New York. For
an extended discussion of Strategic Factors in Business Cycles see the recent
volume of that title by Professor J. M. Clark (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1934).BASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY
their plant. The main factor in the eventual revival of demand
for capital goods seems to be obsolescence rather than a fall in
their price. The element of price enters mainly in determining
whether replacements should be made. The process of technical
innovation and improvement is also an important factor in re-
ducing costs of production.
The question that presents itself is whether, pending the
obsolescence of existing plant, the production of capital goods
must necessarily fall off so sharply with the accompaniment
of a corresponding decrease in general production, in con-
sumption, in employment, and in real national income.
The heart of the problem of business fluctuation has long been
recognized to lie in this rise and fall of investment in new capital
goods, both producers' goods and durable consumers' goods.
While itis probably true that some check can be effectively
placed upon excessive activity in capital goods industries on the
upswing by the exercise of 'monetary' weapons alone, yet in them-
selves they would appear from recent experience to be powerless
to restore the community's purchasing power once the reaction
from excessive capital investment has occurred. Plentifully avail-
able funds may help in preparing the way for new investment,
but they will not induce it so long as the prospective rate of profit
on it is likely to be a minus quantity: in other words, until the
process of readjustment through depreciation, obsolescence, the
introduction of new inventions and the development of new
products has been effected.
A program of flexible controlled public works may in its
broader aspects be properly viewed as one special application
of a fiscal policy which attempts to smooth fluctuations of ac-
tivity by alternately accumulating balances in periods of
prosperity and disbursing them during years of depression.
The possible forms these 'balances' might take—a highly im-
portant aspect of the problem—are discussed more fully be-
low. In many important respects, though not in all, the basic370 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
problems raised would be similar in schemes for building up
and subsequently expending unemployment insurance funds,
industrial reserves, consumer reserve funds, and the like. The
effect in all cases should be a tendency to check net profits in
periods of prosperity and therefore to moderate the upward
swing. During depressions, on the other hand, their expendi-
ture should tend to help maintain the general level of con-
sumption. In the case of public works reserves the effect upon
the maintenance of activity in capital goods industries should
be even more important: this is not equally true of unemploy-
merit and other consumer reserve funds.
In the light of this very bare outline of a theoretical frame
of reference for the appraisal of a flexible public works policy
it would appear that the aim of the latter during depressions
should be, first, to promote the maintenance of durable goods
production at a level higher than it would otherwise be pend-
ing new 'normal' demand for them; and second, to stimulate
new demand for durable goods. This it would aim to do by
increasing production in certain groups of durable goods
industries and by furthering the demand for other durable
goods by these groups. Expanded public works should also
help maintain consumption. During periods of prosperity the
opposite policy would naturally be the appropriate course of
action to pursue.
It follows that accelerated emergency public construction
should as far as possible take the form of capital investment
which, while increasing the national stock of durable goods,
does not compete with private industry or aggravate its diffi-
culties. Nor would the aggregate volume of public works
undertaken over the period of years, good and bad together,
which embrace a complete cycle, be any larger than otherwise.
The objective would merely be a better time-distribution.
The effect of public works in directly financing consumption
should not be overstressed. Since, during depressions, it is inBASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY
the capital goods industries that the fall in production and
employment is greatest, increased activity on their part will
incvitably Thediiect
financing of additional consumption, however, is likely to
have only distant, indirect and delayed effects on the produc-
tion of capital goods. The main function of expanded public
works is thus to induce a secondary current of private orders
and stimulate private enterprise. Public construction expendi-
tures under long-range planning should therefore during
depressions describe a curve which passes through a maximum
and thereafter declines when private expenditures begin to
increase.
SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC WORKS CONTROL
In light of the examination of specific practical difficulties
made above, it need not be emphasized that at best the policy
can operate only within certain limits. A large proportion of
public works is non-shiftable in time, and the problem is en-
visaged artificially if public bodies are thought normally to
have unrestricted freedom of choice between different proj-
ects, none of them especially urgent. Hitherto the latitude of
choice open to governmental agencies in the United States
has been rather strictly limited because they have almost
always been behindhand, often through no fault of their own,
in the supply of much-needed public facilities. Yet this con-
dition of affairs has in itself been largely the outcome of the
failure to plan public improvements in advance. Effective
long-range programs of public works, framed with reference
to future as well as present needs, should admit of anticipa-
tion equally with postponement of projects. That public
works may to some extent during emergencies be carried out
earlier than would otherwise have been possible, with the
benefits of both lowered costs and increased employment,372 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
seems to be evidenced by the experience of several countries
durIng the few years following the close of the War, and again
more recently.4
Any adequate system of controlled public works must thus
obviously be based 'upon careful, comprehensive long-range
planning of public improvement projects, and would involve
both their deliberate retardation during prosperity and their
acceleration in periods of unemployment. Though the' vol-
ume of work which can be conducted on an elastic schedule is
clearly not sufficient to eliminate all cyclical fluctuation in
the absence of the regularization of private construction and
industry in general, it might well constitute an important
element in a general program for the stabilization of employ-
ment.
The exact proportion of improvement expenditures in the
country as a whole that is susceptible to reallocation by advance-
ment or postponement clearly cannot be determined, but some
light is thrown on the problem by Professor Loucks' analysis of
the situation in Philadelphia over the period It was
found that about 50 per cent of the total improvement expendi-
tures from loan funds by the city proper could have been consid-
ered shiftable from one year to another during that period, and
that had the city's expenditures of loan funds on municipal
improvements been distributed over that period with a view to
the reduction of unemployment, io to 15 per cent of the jobless
could have been absorbed in any one year as a result. This per-
centage seems small, but there is reason to believe that it could
be much increased were the long-range planning of public works
adopted more systematically and prevailed over a wider area. The
effects of local expenditures in stimulating or restraining indus-
trial activity elsewhere, as also conversely of expenditures else-
Unemployment and Public Works (International Labour Office, 1931),pp.
105—68.
5W. N. Loucks, The Stabilization of Employment in Philadelphia, pp.
181 sqq.BASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY
where upon local conditions, had necessarily to be excluded from
this study by reason of its limited scope.
THE ARGUMENT THAT CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES MERELY
EFFECT A DIVERSION OF RESOURCES
The objection has been advanced to a flexible public works
policy that capital raised by public authorities for construc-
tion work in times of depression represents merely a diversion
of resources from private industry to public enterprise, espe-
cially by raising the costs of borrowing and of labor and ma-
terials, and therefore cannot create any addition to the sum
total of employment. While it is not possible at this point to
enter into a full discussion of all aspects of this vexed ques-
tion, the argument seems to rest upon certain questionable
assumptions.
The contention has been stated as follows: "It is not per-
missible to regard the additional employment offered by the
enlargement of public building activities as so much net in-
crease in the total volume of employment available. The
assumption disregards the fact that an extension of public
works has to be financed with funds, part of which at least
would otherwise have been used by private enterprise." 0
Since,however, there is usually during depression periods a
surplus of idle funds seeking secure investment at attractive
returns, which private industry is unable or unwilling to
utilize, its use by public bodies need not necessarily involve
transference of spending power from private enterprise, in-
asmuch capital might otherwise not have been em-
ployed at all.7 If the expansion of government expenditures
G. Bielschowsky, Business Fluctuations and Public Works, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, February 193o, p. 297.
"It is well established by the study of business cycles that total income and
total expenditure are not a fixed fund but do fluctuate and that the short-run
effect of enlarged expenditure, in one direction, and correspondingly enlarged374 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
is accompanied by an expansion of credit, additional means
of payment may be created and a net increase in employment
effected, and this in turn by bringing about increased con-
sumer and producer demand and stimulating industry could
relieve the credit contraction which characterizes a downward
trend of activity. "Industry has expanded after trade depres-
sion in the past without any prior increase in capital resources,
because the expansion itself provides the resources out of
which expansion is possible. The problem isto find the
causes that stimulate expansion, and the placing of a large
number of government contracts might be one of them."
Because business men are reluctant in periods of industrial
depression to make capital expenditures in the face of uncer-
tainty, declining costs and prevailing excess productive capacity,
funds are likely to lie idle as unemployed bank, personal and
corporate balances, and it is from these reservoirs of credit that
the means to finance expanded public works programs could be
largely drawn. This need cause no diversion of resources. The
enlargement in the volume of public construction financed in
this manner could of course be only temporary, but it mIght be
effective in increasing purchasing power when most needed and
in assisting general business "The experience of govern-
ments has been generally speaking ...thatit has been possible
to raise money in the capital market for public works without
productive activity,is not necessarily to diminish expenditure and activity
elsewhere, but more likely to increase it, the stimulus being diffused in cumu-
lative fashion. There is elasticity in the credit mechanism and back of this
there is slack in corporate and personal budgets" (J. M. Clark, Long-Range
Planning, American Economic Review, Supplement, March p. i8).
Henry Clay, The Post-War Unemployment Problem (London, 1929),p.129.
a Thepoint has been concisely stated by Professor J. M. Clark: "Funds may
he raised by drawing on general balances, by short-term borrowing, or by the
sale of long-term securities somewhat earlier than they would otherwise have
been sold. And the probabilities are all in favor of this being done without
giving rise to reactions which would neutralize the effect and would defeat
the end in view" (American Economic Review, Supplement, March 1930,
p.18).BASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY 375
increasing the difficulties of other enterprises in raising capital
for their purposes." 10
Itshould be emphasized, however, that a public works
program undertaken in conjunction with an appropriate
central bank policy can prove successful only if government
credit is secure, the capital market strong, and the demand
for bonds elastic. Otherwise there is danger that any reflation
effected through credit creation and expanded public ex-
penditures may be offset by a decline in private activity re-
sulting from general lack of confidence, financial uneasiness
and consequent increased cost of raising capital. This is a
proviso of absolutely fundamental importance: it is devel-
oped at greater length below.
During periods of depression the piling up of idle bank
balances causes a decrease in the quantity of the total effective
means of payment in circulation, and this condition would
be remedied, subject to the conditions just noted, by ex-
panded public works financed directly or indirectly by means
of loans from the banks.1' As Professor Pigou has pointed out,
the funds needed to finance increased building activity dur-
ing depressions might be provided partly as a result of the
reduction of expenditures which would be required for direct
unemployment relief and partly by creating bank credits or
by preventing their continued contraction in volume.12 In-
deed, Hawtrey, in commenting upon this argument, goes so
far as to claim that the chief virtue of the policy lies in the
Unemployment and Public Works(International Labour Office,1931),
p.30.
11 Inperiods of depression "the rapidity of circulation is low, because people
cannot find outlets for their surplus funds and they accumulate idle balances.
If the Government comes forward with an attractive gilt-edged loan, it may
raise money not merely by taking the place of other possible capital issues.
butbysecuring money that would otherwise have remained idle in balances"
(R. G. Hawtrey, cited in Clay, op. cit., p.
Correctives of the Trade Cycle, in Is Unemploynzent Inevitable?376 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
credit expansion it would occasion, and iii substance asserts
that that objective directly pursued and unaccompanied by
added expenditures on public works would be equally effec-
tive: that is, that the employment of this device is an unneces-
sarily roundabout method of aiming at a desirable end.'3
STIMULATED CONSTRUCTION AS A MEANS OF CREDIT EXPANSION
But can this objective be successfully attained by direct
means? The policy of flooding the banks with cheap money
by means of a low rediscount rate supported by large security
purchases may not have the desired effect of creating bank
deposits and increased consumer buying and producer bor-
rowing, or the process may be long delayed. There is no guar-
antee that sound borrowers will come forward automatically.
Experience has repeatedly shown that making borrowing
easier will not necessarily in a severe depression of itself en-
courage business activity. That depends upon whether busi-
ness men consider they can increase production profitably,
and that in turn depends largely upon the probable future
volume of demand and the trend of prices. Ultimately it is
a question of profits, actual or prospective.
In these circumstances, it has been argued, the way to
achieve credit expansion is through a sufficiently enlarged
public works program to ensure that the additional credit
made available will be effectively utilized. The expenditure
of large sums for construction purposes, by giving jobs to the
idle both directly, and to a greater extent indirectly, should
stimulate production and bring about a recovery of commod-
ity and security prices, the first essentials to arrest the process
of liquidation. Once a severe depression has developed, what
ever may have been the factors originally responsible in caus-
Public Expenditures and the Demand for Labour, Economica, March 1925
(reprinted in Trade and Credit, 1928).BASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY 377
ing recession, business is likely to continue long to take an
unsteadily downward course by reason of the sheer cumulative
momentum of the forces at work. If it is true that these can
be checked and reversed by increased spending, governmental
authorities may have to take the initiative themselves, since
little can be expected from appeals to a nervous and impover-
ished public. One should not assume that because depressions
are precipitated by previous overexpansion, they will there-
fore necessarily be remedied by a mere reduction in total
spending: for though the process of contraction does represent
a reaction from maladjustments, it may well intensify these
maladjustments and create others. A necessary measure of
corrective liquidation involving some reduction of spending
and lowering of prices is not the same thing as purely destruc-
tive deflation produced by a panic-generated passion for liq-
uidity. Since contraction will not of itself ensure redudtion
of prices where it is most needed, public works expenditures
may help during depression in effecting read] ustments by
keeping up the total volume of spending to some extent and
preventing a runaway deflation which may go far beyond the
lengths required to effect these readjustments. Furthermore,
the aim of a long-range policy of controlled public works
would be precisely the prevention of the overexpansion which
leads to reaction. But the foregoing argument again is subject
to the twofold proviso mentioned above, namely, that the
expansionist policy during depressions does not increase the
difficulties of private industry, first, by raising the cost of new
capital through injury done to the bond market and the banks
in consequence of weakened confidence, and, second, by rais-
ing the cost of construction materials and building labor.378 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
POSSIBLE DEFLATIONARY CONSEQUENCES OF
EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS
This proviso is crucial and requires further examination.
Sustained recovery must of necessity under the existing eco-
nomic order be dependent almost wholly upon the revival of
business spending. Public expenditures normally constitute
far too small a proportion of all expenditures for any feasible
expansion of the former to take the place of business spending.
The most that can be hoped for from increased public spend-
ing is that it will 'prime the pump' of private spending. This
it will do only if its effect is to strengthen business confidence,
for the latter is a necessary condition for the resumption of
business spending.
Now there is danger, for various reasons, that large public
works expenditures may, by causing private enterprise to
reduce its expenditures, deepen rather than relieve depres-
sion. This danger is likely to be especially great when the
accelerated outlays are made not as part of a pro-
gram of alternate contraction and expansion, but are under-
taken. in an emergency, without having been previously
retarded—the object being to 'support the market'. In this
study we have been chiefly concerned with the former type
of policy and have considered improvised emergency expen-
ditures only incidentally. The possible effects of the latter
course of action in provoking a contraction in business spend-
ing call, however, for brief discussion, since even long-range
programs may have the same effects, though the probability
of their doing so would be much smaller.'4
Greatly enlarged public works expenditures, especially if
14Theargument of the remainder of this section owes much to Professor
Sumner H. Slichter's paper, The Economics of Public Works, American
Economic Review, Supplement, March 1934,pp.174—85, and his recent book,
Towards Stability (Henry Holt, 1934), pp. 36—7,143—9.BASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY
there is doubt as to how long the policy will be continued,
may be looked upon by the business community as creating
a highly artificial situation. Instead of expanding operations,
business men might well, in these circumstances, postpone
commitments. On the other hand, if the results expected by
the government from increased expenditures are slow in ap-
pearing, and if, because depression continues unabated, the
government borrows and spends progressively larger sums,
probably in the face of declining revenues, the rapid conse-
qient growth of the public debt may engender fear of ultimate
inflation. The more severe the depression, the greater natu-
rally is this danger likely to be. But a fear of ultimate infla-
tion (unlike a conviction of imminent inflation) may have,
not inflationary, but deflationary effects, by finding ekpression
not in the buying of commodities but in the sale of bonds,
the hoarding of cash, and the flight of capital—with conse-
quent weakening of the banks and a competitive struggle on
their part for liquidity. Thus the cost of new borrowing might
be raised to a prohibitive point.
Hardly less important are the possible effects upon other
construction costs, and, through them, upon the relation
between prices within the total price structure. Large ex-
penditures on public works, if made before building costs
have had time to fall, may prevent their doing so, and thus
retard the very readjustments which are most needed for busi-
ness recovery. Expanded public works might thus, by support-
ing building costs, prevent correction of maladjustments and
prolong depression. This was one charge brought against the
government's huge public works program during the recent
depression—that it tended to 'peg' construction costs.
"The government is purchasing materials at the lowest possible
price, but it is buying labor, which represents, of course, a large
part of the total construction cost, at more or less arbitrary prices.
In view of the fact that there is often no price for labor in the380 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
construction industry which may properly be regarded as a market
price, the government is confronted with a difficult problem in
fixing wages on construction jobs. The government has set a scale
for skilled labor of $1.00 an hour in the South, $i.io hi the Mid-
dle states, and $1.20 in the North for skilled labor. In the South,
union men have been striking to get an hour. In many places
in the North, wages of the building crafts, even during the height
of the building boom of 1928—29, did not reach $1.20. Now in the
midst of perhaps the worst depression in our history, the govern-
ment is paying wages which exceed the boom rates in mapy
communities."
Thus the acid test of a policy of controlled public works
is the extent to which it is likely to assist, during depressions,
in correcting those basic maladjustments which are the cause
of depressions, and during prosperity, in preventing their
development. The problem cannot easily be solved a priori,
since so much must depend upon both the manner in which
the policy is put into effect and the varying complex of the
circumstances of the occasion. The danger that the policy
will prove a hindrance rather than a help is likely, however,
to be reduced in proportion as it forms part of a program of
long-range planning. Apart from the aid it might well afford
"S.H. Slichter, The Economics of Public Works, bc. cit. Professor Slichter,
however, goes on to add: "As a matter of fact, I am not particularly alarmed
at the probable effect of wages under the present public works program upon
the revival of business. Fortunately the program has been initiated only after
nearly four years of depression, after the prices of construction materials have
had time to fall, after business men have had ample opportunities to dis-
cover many new ways of changing and cnlarging their operations, and after a
substantial shortage of some types of housing and equipment has developed.
Consequently, although high wage rates on public works may discourage
some private construction and even interfere seriously with the provision of
cheap housing, they are not likely to have a disastrous effect upon recovery.
I do, however, wish to stress emphatically the danger of pegging building
materials and labor by an ambitious program of public works initiated
early in a depression before these prices have had an opportunity to fall..
Forexample, a large public works program in 1930, tending to peg building
costs at 1928—29levels,would have been disastrous."BASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY 381
in preventing the development of maladjustments during the
prosperity phase of the cycle, the policy, when thus employed,
is obviously far less likely during depressions to create diffi-
culties for private business of the sorts enumerated above.
The suggestion has indeed been made that public works
might be deliberately utilized to effect a reduction in the
price of capital goods and thus to aid in removing maladjust-
ments.
"The government might predicate its willingness to expand
construction by a given amount upon the willingness of building
labor and producers of building materials to accept a given reduc-
tion in their prices. In that event, the public works program
would be doubly useful—it would directly tend to increase the
volume of spending and it would accelerate price changes that
are needed in order for change and growth on a large scale to
become profitable." 16
Tosum up: The effects of increased public works expendi-
tures during depressions will largely depend upon the extent
to which they remove or reinforce the maladjustments that
precipitated the depression and, by so doing, stimulate or
retard business spending. The prospects of their successful
utilization in effecting readjustments will in turn depend
largely upon the degree of long-range planning they repre-
sent. "If the government expenditures have been carefully
planned, they should assist in removing the causes of depres-
sion because most maladjustments are more easily corrected
on a rising market than on a falling one....Evenwhen a
policy of strict laissez-faire is pursued, recovery does not wait
for all maladjustments to be removed...itis, in large
measure, through revival itself that some are
eventually eliminated." 17
S. H. Slichter, Towards Stability, pp.
17S.H. Slichter,cit., p. 40.382 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
FURTHER OBJECTIONS EXAMINED
Some more popular objections frequently advanced against
public works expansion in depression can be dealt with more
briefly. The objection that the additional debt contracted
involves a future increased burden of taxation rests, when
thus expressed, on a confusion of thought. Business recovery,
provided it occurs—and this assumes that government spend-
ing is successful in hastening recovery—is likely to bring
increased tax receipts without the imposition of additional
taxation. It is precisely the contraction of incomes conse-
quent upon a decline in business activity that is responsible
for the increase during depressions of the real burden of fixed
indebtedness. Tn other words, if the policy succeeds, its cost
will be more than paid for by the restoration of business
activity. But if it fails, the increase in public debt may, imme-
diately or subsequently, have serious consequences. Thus the
argument that public works expenditures financed by bor-
rowing do injury in depressions by 'unbalancing' the budget
is not wholly unfounded. For though the answer is valid that
the budget can only be brought into an enduring balance if
the national income is increased, and that this can come about
only through a restoration of business activity, still the danger
exists in the short run that if a badly unbalanced budget
lessens business confidence, it may reduce private activity by
a greater amount than public activity is increased by ex-
panded expenditures. It remains true, however, that we can-
not all grow prosperous if everyone, including public bodies,
spends progressively less and less, That way lies universal
impoverishment.
With respect to the charge of inevitable waste, no excessive
waste need occur if projects have been planned in advance,
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with the economic waste of idle and deteriorating man power
and capital equipment. Besides, since the unemployed must
be .cupporteci in event out. of public or private funds, the
real net direct cost of public works, apart from their possible
indirect stimulating effects, is much less than it seems, while
in addition the community receives something in return for
its expenditures. Thus the apparent magnitude o€ the cost
is deceptive. For first, there must be deducted from the gross
cost both the saving in unemployment relief and the increased
tax receipts which should in time flow into the treasury as a
result of the increased incomes(including profits) of the
recipients. Second, public outlays on capital developments
bring the community a twofold socially beneficial return,
which relief expenditures do not: they augment its physical
assets and they preserve the industrial skill and the morale of
those given employment. Third, as shown below, there are
in addition their equally important indirect effects in creat-
ing 'secondary' employment and in starting the ball rolling
again.
Finally it is often asserted that a sufficient volume of genu-
inely needed public works cannot be found in depression
periods to give substantial employment. This objection would
of course fall to the ground if construction programs were to
be planned in advance and retarded in periods of prosperity.
But even though this has not been the case during the recent
depression, still the statement is wholly unjustified, at least
with respect to the United States. For in all parts of the
country billions of dollars worth of authorized and sometimes
already initiated projects were suspended through the whole-
sale elimination of all possible construction items from nu-
merous local budgets because of the shortage of funds, though
this was not true of the Federal government. Road- and
bridgebuilding, in particular, is an example of construction
work suitable for this purpose both because it can be put in384 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
hand rapidly and entails expenditures that are bound to be
made sooner or later. Schemes for slum clearance and the
•erection of decent workers' dwellings suffer from the defect
that in most cities comprehensive and detailed plans have
hitherto not existed, but they offer almost boundless oppor-
tunities in the future for construction work of the highest
social utility, if certain basic problems of financing can be
satisfactorily solved. -
'SELF-LIQUIDATING'CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
What criteria should be applied in the choice of public
works to be undertaken during depressions apart from so-
cial desirability and the possibility of their speedy initiation?
Obviously they should be such as will not compete with pri-
vate business and adversely affect existing capital structures.
Should they, however, further take the form as far as possible
of 'self-liquidating' projects, as was stipulated in the Emer-
gency Relief and Construction Act of 1932? (See Ch. I). It
has been argued that self-liquidating public works weaken
the consumer market by withdrawing purchasing power that
would ordinarily have been spent on goods and services
through the payment of tolls and fees, and should therefore
be avoided, even though their social value may be great. This
criticism does not seem to be valid. It is true that the consumer
market will be weakened consequent to the collection of tolls
for the liquidation of these projects, but this is more likely
to occur after revival has already set in than during the period
of depression, when the projects are still under construction,
unless the depression is protracted. If the aim of a public
works program is to speed up construction during depressions
and reduce capital development during periods of prosperity,
self-liquidating projects are economically sound in theory.
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when there is a decline in purchasing power and withdrawing
it when spending is too liberal. If public works are designed
to correct a condition of alternate overexpansion and over-
contraction of capital goods industries, self-liquidating proj-
ects need not be avoided. The chief difficulty, however, is to
find such projects in sufficient volume. For this reason no great
weight can ordinarily be attached to the self-liquidating char-
acter of projects to be undertaken during depressions. If the
object of such expenditures is to increase the total volume
of purchasing power, the choice of projects must be deter-
mined primarily by their social utility rather than by the
prospect of a specific yield accruing from the services to which
the projects are devoted.
'SECONDARY' EFFECTS OF FLEXIBLE PUBLIC WORKS
EXPENDITURES
Increased public expenditures on capital development give
employment not only to the men directly engaged on the
projects on which the money is spent, but also to those pro-
ducing and transporting the construction materials required.
This employment, direct and indirect, may be designated the
'primary' employment created by the gross amount of the
initial new expenditure. But the increased purchasing power
resulting from the additional aggregate incomes received by
those thus engaged will in turn be expressed in increased de-
mand for other goods which will further increase employ-
ment; and so on, in a series of waves—though always subject
to the qualifications made above concerning the possible
effects on business spending. The employment created by
these repercussions may be termed the 'secondary' employ-
ment created by the initial additional expenditure on public
works.
If the process continued indefinitely it would be sufficientg86 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
to put one man to work on roadhuilding to keep the entire
population employed providing for his 'secondary' needs.'8
But although the process is cumulative, its effects -do not
multiply indefinitely. At each stage, because of various leak-
ages, whose magnitude will depend upon the phase of the
business cycle, a certain proportion of the increased income
will not eventuate in increased employment.bD Some of the
added income will be saved, some will merely be a substitute
for previous expenditure by private charity, some be
used to pay off old debts. These are deflationary tendencies
likely to occur if increased expenditure is concentrated in a
period of depression. Some of the increased income might
also be spent on imports, or raise prices and thus diminish
consumption, unless producers spent their increased profits.
During a depression there probably would be less leakage on
the score of higher prices, because there would be a great deal
of unused productive capacity, so that industry could take its
increased gains by a larger turnover at the same price.
The net effect of a given volume of expenditure can there-
fore be calculated if we assume the proportion of these leak-
ages, letting our assumptions vary with the circumstances.
Thus there may be no secondary employment if there is little
or no margin of unemployed resources, for the additional
purchasing power is then likely to be reflected in higher prices
and increased imports. If the increased income took the place
It. F. Kahn, The Relation of Home Investment to Unemployment, The
Economic Journal, June 1931.Theanalysis of 'leakages' which follows was
first developed by Mr. Kahn in this article. See also his paper on Public
Works and Inflation, American Statistical Association Journal, Supplement,
March andJ. M. Keynes, The Means to Prosperity (London, 1933).Cf.
Mark Mitnitzky, Economic Effects of Changes in Consumers' Demand, Social
Research, May 1934.
19 Theassumption must of course be made that the original expenditure
represents a net addition to the aggregate volume of purchasing power and
does not merely replace previous expenditure, for otherwise no cumulative
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of a 'dole' paid for by borrowing, there would be scarcely any
repercussions at all. On the other hand, if the dole were paid
by the the 'dde' presuniably
lead to an increase in the taxpayer's purchasing power.
The problem, then, is to discover the total employment,
primary and secondary together, created by a given amount
of additional 'loan-expenditure'; to ascertain what J.M.
Keynes calls the multiplier relating the total employment to
the primary employment. He calculates it to be, in depression,
about 2.
He uses as an example the primary expenditure of $100,which
he divides into two parts: 20(i) moneywhich does not become
additional income, consisting of cost of imported materials, cost
of goods not newly produced but merely transferred, cost of pro-
ductive resources of men and plant not additionally employed
but merely taken from other jobs, and cost of wages substituted
for income derived from a dole paid for by borrowing; (2)money
which does become additional income. This may be either spent
or saved.
To obtain the multiplier two magnitudes must be estimated:
the proportion of a typical expenditure becoming someone's in-
come and the proportion of this income which is spent. These
two proportions multiplied together give us the ratio of the first
repercussion to the primary effect, since they give us the ratio of
the second flow of expenditure to the initial flow of expenditure.
To sum up the whole series of repercussions, we may assume that
the second repercussion will bear the same ratio to the first reper-
cussion as the first bore to the primary effect.
Under conditions of serious depression, such as existed when
he was writing, Keynes suggests as a reasonable figure the deduc-
tion of 30percent of expenditure which for one reason or an-
other does not increase incomes, leavingper cent accruing to
one person or another in current income. Of this 70percent
additional income, he further assumes that perhaps 70percent
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will be spent and 30 per cent saved: On these assumptions the
first repercussion will be 49 per cent (7 x 7) of the primary effect,
or approximately one-half; the second repercussion will be one-
half of the first repercussion, that is, one quarter of the primary
effect, and so on. Thus the multiplier is 2:(the sum of the series
'.+ '/2 +i% + etc.).Since seven-eighths of the total effects would
come from the primary expenditure and the first two repercus-
sions, the time-lags involved would not be very serious.
If the increased demand led to increased prices, the rise in
prices would gradually diminish the proportion that becomes new
income, surplus resources becoming depleted and a large propor-
tion of the new expenditure merely being diverted from other
jobs. Higher prices would also mean higher profits, and since
more of the increased income would become profits rather than
wages more of it would probably be saved. The multiplier would
diminish as a result, but that would be indicative of the success
of the remedy.
lit is chiefly in estimating the proportion of expenditure that
becomes additional income •that we must be cautious. Keynes
thinks that under present or recent circumstances not less than
6o per cent of additional expenditure would become additional
income, and that not less than 75 per cent of this would be spent.
He further believes that the American multiplier would be greater
than two rather than less. "The more nearly an economic system
is self-sufficient, and the smaller the relative importance of its
international trade, the larger will be the multiplier by which
we obtain the total effect of additional expenditure on employ-
ment. For the smaller are the deductions to be made in respect of
imports. The multiplier is also likely to be large in the United
States because of the absence of any system of unemployment
relief paid for out of loans, so that incomes of American workers
from increased employment are likely to be in the main addi-
tipnal incomes." 21
The above analysis of the effects of increased expenditure on employment
canequallywell be expressed in terms of its effects upon the community's
aggregate money income. New funds put into active circulation through en-
larged government expenditures are likely to increase the total income ofthe community by more than their own amount, if we assume that the
effects are not offset by a contraction of private activity. A hundred dollars
injected into the market not only become net income to that amount to all
those engaged in the various processes of production between the original
producer and the ultimate consumer, but, if spent by the recipients, also
set in train a new circuit of production and become income for a second
chain of producers. If we call the number of times money passes through
the production sequente before again becoming income in any given period
its income velocity (in contradistinction to its transactions velocity), then new
expenditures will raise the national income by the amount initially injected
multiplied by its income velocity. In boom years the latter appeared to
have been about three per annum in the United States and Great Britain.
Obviously during depressions itislikely to be markedly less, because, as
shown above, new spendable funds are not wholly employed in making new
purchases, or are utilized more slowly, part being held idle at each stage in
cash or deposits. But even if the income velocity of money in depression is
not more than one and a half or two, the injection of a given quantity of
money would still increase the community's money income by perhaps twice
its own amount.
The suggestion is not intended that the results reached by the income--
velocity method and the 'multiplier' method are necessarily the same. As Mr.
1). H. Robertson of Cambridge University has pointed out to me, the one
relates to the increase in income per annum, the other to the aggregate in-
crease from the time of the original injection until Judgment Day. "The
multiplier method assumes that all injected money ultimately, and most of
it quite soon, will become non-existent or completely inert. This may of
course happen—but has always seemed to me an odd case to take as a
standard of reference" (Letter to the author).
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PROVISION AND ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC WORKS RESERVES
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For the ancingpublic works in periods
depression arrangements must previously be made for the
rapid provisionof fundswhen needed. The actual form the
reserve should take is a matter of some dispute and the par-
ticular methods suitable are not necessarily the same in all
cases. One proposal is that reserve funds should be accumu-
lated and invested in 'gilt-edge' securities or deposited in a
bank; another is that they should be held in the form of bank
notes so that the circulation would be alternately contracted
and expanded. But whether or not actual funds are accumu-
lated in advance, it is imperative that adequate credit reserves89° PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
be created and, in the case of municipalities in the United
States, that a much larger unencumbered margin of constitu-
tional borrowing power be preserved than hitherto. For pub-
lic construction must be undertaken during periods of
depression either mainly from loans or from previously accu-
mulated reserves, the debts in the former case being amortized
at an accelerated rate during years of prosperity from budget
surpluses. Again, money that would normally go in reduction
of public debt could in depressions be used for public works.
It should be noted at the outset, however, that theoretically
it makes no difference whether the financing of controlled
public works is effected by means of funds accumulated in
periods of prosperity and expended during depressions, or
by means of bonds issued during depressions and subse-
quently redeemed during prosperity. For in both cases, unless
counteracting measures are taken, the effect is likely to be
to reduce the rate of interest in times of prosperity and thus
stimulate private capital investment and to raise it during
the depression period and make the resumption of private ac-
tivity more difficult.
One of the greatest problems of a flexible public works
policy has been shown above to be the danger that additional
funds disbursed during depressions may reduce the flow of
funds disbursed by private business. If the prosperity reserve
previously accumulated has been invested in government
securities, their liquidation during a depression for the pur-
pose of securing the funds required for the expanded con-
struction program might weaken the bond market and retard
private capital investment. It is important therefore to make
sure that the additional funds injected into the market by
public agencies are not offset by a contraction induced in
private activity.
The relative efficacy of various possible methods of adminis-
tration of public works reserves is therefore a question ofBASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY 391
prime importance.22 Such reserves may be viewed as either a
substitute for or supplement to Federal Reserve control of
crcdEt, hence raise problemsof possibleconflictinto
whichwe cannot enter here. The various possible methods
of operating the funds may be classified as follows. They
could be placed in deposits with commercial banks, Federal
Reserve banks, or with savings banks. They could be invested
in commercial paper or short-term obligations of the Federal
government purchased in the open market. They could be
invested in United States government bonds purchased and
sold in the open market, or purchased from and sold to the
Federal Reserve banks, or purchased from and sold to the
United States Treasury. Finally, they might be kept either
in whole or in part in money hoards.
The analysis which follows relates specifically to the adminis-
tration of Federal reserves, and would need to be modified ac-
cordingly if applied to those of local governments. The latter
might, for example, be invested in the securities of the political
unit involved.
Whether the reserves were placed in demand deposits or in
savings deposits, the volume of effective money during the period
of prosperity would be likely to be curtailed, but the demand
deposits method would have the further advantage of compel-
ling bankers to carry a higher reserve ratio. Nor would the danger
be great that withdrawal of deposits in the period of depression
would force liquidation of bank assets, because these funds would
for the most part find their way into the consumer market and
appear elsewhere as new deposits. The investment of public works
reserves in short-term securities would also tend to check the
221n what follows in this section I have drawn heavily, to the point of sum-
marizing his argument, upon Professor Alvin Hansen's paper, The Flow
of Purchasing Power, Special Report No. VIII, in Economic Reconstruction
(Columbia University Press, 1934).ThoughProfessor Hansen's analysis re-
lates to Consumer Reserves,itapplies at many points equally well, in
slightly modified form, to public works reserves.392 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
expansion of the effective money supply during the boom period,
by encroaching upon the available secondary reserve and thus
necessitating the carrying of a larger primary reserve. Placement
in demand deposits, however, would probably be the more effec-
tive method in restraining bank credit expansion. Both methods
offer advantages in the maintenance of purchasing power during.
the depression. The effects in all the cases considered above and
below will naturally depend largely upon the order of magnitude
of the reserve funds.
The savings deposits method imposes some restraint upon the
expansion of the effective money supply during the boom period
butinvestmentof the reserve funds in Federal bonds through
open market purchases imposes none upon the volume of bank
credit in this phase of the cycle. During the depression phase
bothmethods involvetheliquidationofbonds,butthe
savings deposit method would involve a less disastrous liquida-
tion. The banks are likely to lose less by unloading their assets
and paying off the public works reserve deposits progressively as
the depression deepens before the full effect of the liquidation
has affected bond prices than under the second method where
the liquidation of bonds is made by the public works reserve. In
that case, the banks, not having to pay off deposits to the reserve
funds, would presumably find themselves at the end of the de-
pression period with a larger volume of both deposit obligations
and bonds than would be the case under the first method: but
they would be likely to suffer at the close of the depression the
full measure of the bond depreciation.
Should the public works reserve funds be placed as demand
deposits with the Federal Reserve banks, the sums would be trans-
ferred from member bank balances in the Federal Reserve banks
to the new accounts and the reserves of the member banks would
thereby be reduced. Conversely, when the reserve fund withdrew
deposits, the ultimate effect would be to build up member banks'
reserves. The latter would therefore be alternately contracted
and expanded. The purchase and sale of bonds by the public
works reserve fund from and to the Federal Reserve banks wouldBASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY
also serve to stabilize the effective money supply, but the deposit
method would help keep the liabilities and assets of the Federal
Reserve banks intact, the only effect of this procedure being to
transfer a partthe dcposits ofmber banks with the
Reserve to the public works reserve funds. The bond purchase
and sale method, however, tends to force a somewhat violent
fluctuation in the deposit liabilities and assets of the Federal
Reserve banks. Neither method, moreover, ensures an appropri-
ate adjustment of member bank reserves to the stabilization pro.
gram, and the Federal Reserve system would be forced to take
steps to modify the arbitrary influence of the accumulation of
public works reserves. The purchase and sale of bonds from and
to the United States Treasury instead of the Federal Reserve
banks would relieve the latter of the necessity of loading up their
portfolios with great quantities of government bonds. The Treas-
ury Department would instead purchase those bonds and issue
against them legal tender notes, but the method would have the
obvious objection of periodically pumping large quantities of
such notes into circulation.
The hoarding method could place such a powerful restraint
upon bank credit expansion during the boom period that, if used
to the limit, it would endanger the power of the Federal Reserve
system to control the situation.If, however, the hoarding is
placed under the control of the Federal Reserve banks, the
method becomes a mere formality. The alternative method of
purchase and sale of bonds from and to the Federal Reserve sys-
tem merely reinforces, and makes more effective, the open market
operations. If the hoards assumed entirely the form of gold and
lawful money they would denude the Federal Reserve banks of
their cash resources. Whereas the demand deposit method affects
the reserves of the member banks, the hoarding method affects
the reserves of the Federal Reserve banks themselves. The re-
straining effect is therefore enormously greater.
Of these various possible methods of administration of the re-
serve funds, that of cash hoards would produce violent fluctuations
in the reserves of the Federal Reserve banks, and for that reason
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would threaten their very basis. Three other methods would pro-
duce fluctuations in the surplus reserves of member banks—de-
posit with the Federal Reserve banks, purchase of bonds from
and sale to the Reserve banks, and exchange against United States
notes. Three would tend to affect the reserve requirements of the
member banks by forcing them to carry a larger reserve because
of the character of the liability or encroachment upon secondary
reserves: deposit with commericial banks, placement in savings
deposits, and investment in short-term maturities. One method,
investment in bonds purchased and sold in the open market,
would appear as likely to have little influence upon either the
volume of reserves or reserve requirements.
Choice between these methods and other possible varia-
tions of them must in practice be determined by a complex
of factors too numerous to discuss here. The consideration
of prime importance, in attempting to maintain a steady total
flow of purchasing power, is the need for expanding public
outlays as private outlays begin to contract. The substitution
by the banks of investments (in the assets owned by the public
works reserve funds) for loans, as private activity slowed
down, would prevent a decline in the total volume of bank
credit. Combined with the reverse process in periods of ex-
panding private activity a more even flow of funds as between
good and bad times should be effected. During the latter the
banks would offset the decline in loans to business by in-
creased investment; when activity revived they would be
relieved of some of their investments and would be in a posi-
tion again to place more funds in loans. A flexible public
works policy thus operated might do much to maintain total
purchasing power during periods of declining private busi-
ness activity by providing the channels through which credit
might be pumped into the system. Subject to the important
qualifications noted above, it is a fallacy to assume that a
deflationary process involving a general contraction of theBASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY
purchasing power flowing into the system from both public
and private sources is needed to effect a new balance. On the
contrary, ma of purchasing power as a whole should
facilitate the readjustment of factors which is the essential
need in such circumstances. But since the central banking
system apparently cannot successfully bear the entire burden
of preventing violent fluctuations of purchasing power, the
assistance whicha policyofcontrolledpublic expenditures
might lend deserves serious consideration.
LmnTs TO THE OPERATION OF A FLEXIBLE PUBLIC
WORKS POLICY
If unemployment continues for a prolonged period of
years as a result not of cyclical fluctuations but of deep-seated
forces involving secular readjustments to basically changed
conditions, as happened, for example, in Great Britain 23 and
Germany24 during the post-War decade, public works can-
23The policy of expediting public works in periods of unemployment was
officially advocated as early as 1909 in the great British Poor Law report of
that year, and has since been the subject of inquiry by many individuals
and bodies in Great Britain. See, for discussion prior to the depression,
D. H. MacGregor, British Aspects of Unemployment, in Some Aspects of Re-
cent British Economics (Chicago, 1923); and A. L. Bowley and F. D. Stuart,
Regularization of the Demand for Labour, in Is Unemployment Inevitable?
(London, 1924). The proposal was endorsed by both the Liberal and La-
bour Parties: Britain's Industrial Future (Liberal Industrial Inquiry, Lon-
don, 1928); We Can Conquer Unemployment(Liberal Party pamphlet);
Labour and the Nation (Labour Party program); How to Conquer Unem-
ployment (Labour Party pamphlet).See also letter of J. M. Keynes pub-
lished in The Times of August 7, 1929, and Can Lloyd George Do It? by
J. M. Keynes and H. D. Henderson. The proposal was criticized, however,
by the Conservative government in Memoranda on Certain Proposals relat-
ing to Unemployment (Cmd 1929). For discussion of the problem dur-
ing the depression see works mentioned in note 2.
24For accounts in English of German experience with emergency programs
of public works prior to the depression, See M. R. Carroll, Unemployment
Insurance in Germany (Washington, D. C., 1929), and R. C. Davison, Un-
employment Relief in Germany, The Economic Journal, March 1930. The
experience of other countries is examined in Unemployment and Public
Works(International Labour OffIce, especially PartI, Ch. 2 and
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not, of course, be expected to provide increased employment
permanently except at the cost of at least an approximately
equivalent contraction of private expenditures. The only
claim that can be advanced is that when private industry is
unwilling to expand, additional employment and purchasing
power can be provided temporarily in order to give the stim-
ulus needed in order to bring about a revival of activity.
Such stimulation of business during depressions through
the expansion of public works is in the last analysis a counter-
deflationary measure, and their contraction the converse in
periods of upswing. Under an 'automatic' international gold
standard, which demands of all countries adhering to it, not
indeed a common price level, but an internationally interre-
lated price and money income structure, the strict limits to
the pursuit of such a policy by any one country are clear
enough, short of concerted international action. For such
a course adopted by a country in isolation must ordinarily
constitute a threat to its continued adherence to the gold
base. This was largely the difficulty throughout the recent
depression, until our abandonment of gold, with aH proposals
for vigorous expansion of construction programs, though
many who recognized this danger did not regard it as a de-
cisive objection. A large-scale policy of controlled public
works, unless adopted internationally, therefore incurs the
danger of coming into conflict with the underlying principles
of a freely automatic international standard based on gold,
though it need not do so with some form of modified gold
standard operated under central bank cooperation or regu-
lated in some other manner.
The greater the degree of international cooperation in the
execution of an elastic public works policy, the' more successful
is it likely to prove. In the past, however, it has been found
extremely difficult to secure such agreement on concerted poli-
cies between central banks and treasuries, even in periods ofBASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY 397
acute stress, as was instanced by the failure of such proposals to
receive general assent at the World Economic Conference
heldinJ.ondon insummer of iou.Theextension, like-
wise, of the concept of the stabilizing influence of controlled
public works to the similar utilization of other governmental
expenditures should render all the easier the smoothing clown
of cyclical variation in activity. In beth cases the
purposes of the policy would clearly be considerably fur-
thered by greater centralization of control over public works
planning in place of the confusion hitherto created by the
multiplicity of authorities responsible for construction work.
THE PROBLEM OF TIMING
The correct timing of controlled public works is a some-
what vexed question and one of major importance. The
Committee on Recent Economic Changes of the President's
Conference on Unemployment made the following statement
in a report published in 1931:
"The amount of public construction which it is possible to
push forward in order to influence employment and the trend of
business in a period of recession is less important than the timing
of the acceleration. The psychological effect of advancing public
construction at the right time suggests that here is to be found an
important factor in the problem of maintaining a reasonable
economic balance. If properly timed, as the pendulum of employ-
ment starts to swing in an unfavorable direction, the influence
of the prompt expedition of public works is effective out of all
proportion to its size. Timeliness multiplies the effectiveness of
each project accelerated." 25
Thevalidity of the assumption here made, that public
works should be expanded rapidly as early as possible during
a depression, is contingent upon certain important qualifi-
and Control of Public Works, p. xxiii.PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
cations. Since some process of readjustment is probably both
inevitable and desirable once an unhealthy inflationary sit-
uation has been allowed to develop, it would seem to follow
that unless public works have previously been sufficiently
retarded to prevent capital overexpansion and the develop-
ment of serious maladjustments, the right time to launch an
enlarged program is not in the early stages of depression but
only after the strictly unavoidable amount of liquidation has
been effected. At such times as the latter, however, as pointed
out above, a stimulus may be needed to arrest a continued
contraction of business brought about by the cumulative
momentum of the downward process. As business revives and
private enterprise resumes capital outlays in normal volume,
and activity and prices increase, public works programs would
naturally have to be corrçspondinglly contracted under such
a policy. The danger that public works expenditures during
depressions might perhaps actually discourage private con-
struction outlays by creating alarm should be remote if they
represent part of a well considered long-term policy.
It is not possible to decide in advance, and a priori, when
the point at which public works programs could best be
speeded is likely to be reached. The decision must in practice
necessarily be difficult to make and involves the danger of an
incorrect reading of the current situation. The success of any
action taken will in large degree he contingent upon the in-
sight with which current data are interpreted and future
tendencies forecast. The corresponding difficulty is of course
equally great of knowing when, and to what extent, to retard
public works on the upswing. Undeniably there are dangers
inherent in the deliberate postponement of selected construc-
tion projects, and it may be argued that in the present state
of our knowledge and in the absence of any unified control of
industrial processes, the preferable alternative is to avoidBASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY 399
putting the brakes on production as distinct from price in-
flation and speculation in such periods.26
of thethcoüy of
disregards the creation of a prosperity reserve through deliberate
retardation of construction and looks to the continuance in the
future of the steeply rising trend normally shown by public works
expenditures, Ufltji the929 recession, to afford a sufficiently
ample 'unplanned' reserve which could be drawn upon in periods
of cyclical depression largely by advancement of projects which
would have been undertaken later. Stabilization through public
construction would, according to this view, be effected less by
the creation of a reserve volume of public works during prosperity
than by setting up in advance the machinery which would allow,
when needed, the prompt initiation and acceleration of the huge
latent reserve of needed improvements usually already in exist-
ence. If, however, public works are to be expanded at each period
of recurrent unemployment without being correspondingly re-
duced in times of prosperity, their total volume and the money
expended upon them would clearly in the long run be greater
than otherwise, either if they had been left to vary along with, or,
if controlled, to vary inversely to, the fluctuations of private in-
dustry: and this in turn would mean a permanent and progressive
diversion of resources from private to public enterprise.
The greater the degree of stabilization effected either by
private industry through control over its own operations or
by a flexible schedule of public works, the easier of solution
is the problem of correct timing. Since the deliberate alter-
nate expansion and retardation of public Construction are
designed to balance• fluctuations in private business in the
opposite direction, the degree in which they must vary as a
compensating factor will depend upon the violence of the
fluctuations of private industry itself.
Cf.J. M. Clark, Long-Range Planning, American Economic Review, Sup-
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The objections to the concentration of public works in
depression encounter a basic difficulty when it is asked at
what other phase of the business cycle they could better be
put in hand. The reasoning of those who oppose large ex-
penditures at the trough of the cycle would appear to prove
too much, since it virtually amounts to a case against
public works as such. Granting that governments must al-
ways be responsible for a certain volume of public construc-
tion—and this volume has been growing steadily both
absolutely and relatively to private construction with the
state's progressively enlarged economic activities—the onus
rests upon the critics of public works in depressions of
demonstrating not merely that there are certain dangers
their execution at such times, but of showing whether they
could be better undertaken at some other period. Reasons
have been given above for believing that the best time
unlikely to be during the early stages of the downswing.
would seem absurd to argue that they should be undertaken
during the boom phase of the cycle. If public works pro-
grams undertaken in depression may raise building costs
and the cost of borrowing to the detriment of private enter-
prise, they are certainly not less likely to have injurious
effects during the boom period, for their probable effects
then would be further to intensify the inflation. Public con-
struction is ordinarily less likely to have the effect of raising
costs at the bottom of a depression, since private outlays
then tend to fall to a minimum. In the light of these con-
siderations the conclusion would appear justified that pub-
lic works should as far as possible be concentrated in periods
of depression. The danger of incorrect timing, conceded
above, cannot be evaded by a policy of inaction; it is inher-
ent in the nature of government expenditures as such, and
not only on public works.BASIC PROBLEMS OF THEORY 401
CONCLUSION: PUBLIC WORKS AND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
One's evaluation of a policy of flexible public works as an
agency of economic stabilization depends in the last analysis
upon the theory one holds of the fundamental nature of the
business cycle and the effectiveness of 'artificial' correctives
of it under a system of more or less freely competitive pri-
vate enterprise. All students of the problem are agreed on
the importance of securing a proper relationship between
costs and receipts. Those, however, who incline towards advo-
cacy of deliberate control or guidance of industrial and
financial processes, even though only at 'strategic' points,
will tend to approve a policy of planned flexible public
outlays. Those, on the other hand, who regard business de-
pressions as being due to the development of structural
maladjustments impossible to remedy through governmental
intervention and necessitating for recovery the drastic reduc-
tion of costs and the writing down of past liabilities are likely
to condemn increased public expenditures out of borrowings
during depressions. Though in practice the viewpoints of
economists are not susceptible to such sharp and rigid classi-
fication, their individual attitudes to an elastic public con-
struction policy must ultimately be determined by the degree
of faith they repose in the possibilities of the conscious and
nationally planned guidance of economic activity, through
some degree of centralized planning and direction, as op-
posed to the reputedly automatic readjustments of a freely
competitive laissez-faire order.
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